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Abstract
Psychological distance has been shown to influence how people construe an event such that greater distance produces high-
level construal (characterized by global or holistic processing) and lesser distance produces low-level construal (characterized 
by detailed or feature-based processing). The present research tested the hypothesis that construal level has carryover 
effects on how information about an event is retrieved from memory. Two experiments manipulated temporal distance and 
found that greater distance (high-level construal) improves face recognition and increases retrieval of the abstract features 
of an event, whereas lesser distance (low-level construal) impairs face recognition and increases retrieval of the concrete 
details of an event. The findings have implications for transfer-inappropriate processing accounts of face recognition and 
event memory, and suggest potential applications in forensic settings.
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On a daily basis, we encounter many people and witness 
many events. Most of the time, we do not give these people 
and events a second thought. However, there are occasions 
when we need to recognize a person we have seen earlier or 
to reconstruct a sequence of events we have witnessed. The 
ease and accuracy with which we are able to do so depend on 
a number of factors. One such factor is the processing style 
that we employ—either global processing, in which we 
attend to the general meaning of an event and the relation-
ships among its elements, or detailed processing, in which 
we attend primarily to the elements themselves. The present 
research conceptualizes processing style within the frame-
work of construal-level theory, testing the effect of temporal 
distance on person and event memory in naturalistic social 
interactions.
When it comes to recognizing faces, evidence suggests 
that a global processing style optimizes our ability to accu-
rately identify a person we have encountered earlier. This is 
because the act of perceiving a face involves more than pick-
ing out individual facial features. Each face is characterized 
by a unique configuration of those features, and that config-
ural information is critical to the ability to recognize the face. 
Global processing encourages attention to configural infor-
mation (Macrae & Lewis, 2002) and thus is best suited to the 
task of recognizing faces. Indeed, when perceivers are unable 
to use configural information (e.g., when a face is inverted or 
when the top and bottom of different faces are combined in a 
composite face; see Yin, 1969; Young, Hellawell, & Hay, 
1987), recognition performance suffers.
Previous research indicates that manipulations that enco urage 
perceivers to shift away from global processing toward a 
more detailed (i.e., feature-based) processing style disrupt 
face-recognition processes. For example, studies have shown 
that a period of verbal description before a lineup of faces 
results in poorer recognition performance, an effect called 
verbal overshadowing (Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990). 
This effect occurs whether the verbal description is of the tar-
get person, a different person, or even an object (Dodson, John-
son, & Schooler, 1997; Westerman & Larsen, 1997). This 
effect has been explained as a form of transfer-inappropriate 
processing (Schooler, 2002) whereby the task of description 
is thought to encourage participants to focus on detailed or 
featural information that can be easily verbalized. This focus 
carries over to the recognition task, where it interferes with 
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the global processing that would normally help identification 
of the target. 
Further evidence for the transfer-inappropriate processing 
account derives from research by Macrae and Lewis (2002). 
In their experiment, participants were first exposed to a tar-
get person before being presented with a series of Navon 
stimuli (i.e., global letters composed of smaller constituent 
letters) and were asked to report either the elements of stim-
uli (in the local condition) or the overall shape of the stimuli 
(in the global condition). Participants were later given a rec-
ognition task in which they were asked to identify from a 
lineup the person they had seen earlier. Macrae and Lewis 
discovered that participants in the global condition were sig-
nificantly more likely to correctly identify the target com-
pared to those in a no-Navon baseline condition. In contrast, 
those in the local condition were significantly less likely to 
do so. Macrae and Lewis concluded that global instructions 
for performing the Navon task enhanced participants’ use of 
global processing, thereby enhancing face recognition, whereas 
local instructions shifted participants toward detailed pro-
cessing, which disrupted face recognition. 
Macrae and Lewis’s (2002) effects have been replicated 
both in the laboratory (Perfect, 2003; Weston, Perfect, 
Schooler, & Dennis, 2008), and in field studies (Perfect, 
Dennis, & Snell, 2007). Weston and Perfect (2005) also 
demonstrated the complementary effect whereby orienting 
to the local features of the Navon letters speeded subsequent 
performance on a feature-based face-recognition task, namely, 
identification of half-faces in a composite-face test. These stud-
ies collectively provide compelling evidence for a processing 
bias effect on face recognition. 
Thus, the transfer-inappropriate processing account has 
received substantial support from studies in which partici-
pants are explicitly required to focus on global or local details 
of a stimulus and where the final test is recognition based. 
However, previous research has focused on perceptual pro-
cesses by manipulating attention to spatial features or con-
figurations, or investigating the way in which verbalization 
interferes with those processes. In the present work, we apply 
construal-level theory to person memory for the first time, 
exploring the effects of temporal distance on subsequent 
face-recognition memory in Experiment 1, before extending 
this to alternate forms of person memory in Experiment 2. 
To the extent that manipulations of temporal distance (and 
resulting shifts in construal level) have an effect on person 
memory, this would suggest that face processing is influ-
enced not only by manipulations that are closely linked with 
face perception but also by broader differences in global ver-
sus detailed processing style. 
Recent research in social cognition suggests that global 
and local processing can be elicited by simply shifting per-
ceivers’ temporal distance from an event. When asked to con-
sider an event in the near future or recent past, people tend to 
focus on the details (what exactly happened, in what order). 
In contrast, when asked to think about an event in the distant 
future or distant past, they are more likely to perceive it 
abs tract terms (why the event occurred, what it meant). Trope 
and Liberman (2003; see also Liberman & Trope, 2008; 
Liberman, Trope, & Stephan, 2007; Trope, Liberman, & 
Wakslak, 2007) have argued that such findings are evidence 
that psychological distance has direct consequences for con-
strual level. Psychologically close events are construed at a 
low level (i.e., in terms of their specific details) whereas 
psychologically distant events are construed at a high level 
(i.e., in terms of their broader meaning).
Evidence has now accumulated that temporal distance 
influences a wide variety of judgments, and it seems to do so 
by shifting people toward either a high-level global process-
ing style or a low-level detailed processing style. In light of 
the previously discussed literature on transfer-inappropriate 
processing as applied to face recognition, this raises the intrigu-
ing question of whether the same effects might be brought 
about by manipulations of temporal distance. Indeed, Liber-
man and Förster (2009) have recently suggested that psycho-
logical distance may influence face recognition. Recent work 
by Hunt and Carroll (2008) supports this proposal, and it 
provides the starting point for the present line of research. In 
Hunt and Carroll’s study, participants initially studied a pho-
tograph of a face for 10 seconds under explicit study instruc-
tions. Following a 5-minute delay, half the participants 
generated a description of the face they had seen, and half 
completed a filler task, as in the standard verbal overshadow-
ing paradigm. Participants were then randomly assigned to a 
control condition, a near-future condition in which they 
imagined their next day, or a distant-future condition in 
which they imagined a day in their life in 1 year’s time. Par-
ticipants then completed two performance measures. The 
first was a set of insight problem-solving tasks for 2 minutes, 
and the second was a lineup featuring the face they had seen 
earlier alongside five similar foil faces. 
Consistent with the verbal overshadowing literature, Hunt 
and Carroll (2008) found that a verbal description impaired 
subsequent recognition performance. However, they also 
reported that this decrement was overcome by orienting peo-
ple toward the distant future. In contrast, orientation toward 
the near future left the verbal overshadowing effect unaltered. 
The authors argued that invoking greater psychological dis-
tance reinstated a high-level (i.e., global) processing style 
and thus returned perceivers to normal performance levels. 
They also reported that temporal focus influenced insight 
problem solving (believed to be associated with global pro-
cessing), with those in the distant-future condition solving 
more problems than those in the near-future or control condi-
tions, thus providing an independent measure of processing 
bias.
Although these findings are suggestive, they also raise 
a number of questions about the impact of temporal focus 
on recognition memory. One such question involves the 
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unexpected absence of a temporal focus effect in the no-
description control condition. If, as the authors argued, tem-
poral focus has the effect of shifting processing style, then 
one would have expected to find better recognition perfor-
mance in the no-description control group following distant-
future focus, and worse performance following near-future 
focus, in line with the effects of Navon orientation reported 
by Macrae and Lewis (2002). Neither effect was apparent. 
The results of the insight problem-solving task are also only 
suggestive. Because performance on this task is only reported 
as a function of temporal distance (collapsing across the 
description and no-description control conditions), conclu-
sions regarding the extent to which insight task performance 
(i.e., global processing) was related to face recognition are 
obscured. Moreover, the reported pattern shows a dissocia-
tion from that found in the recognition data. The insight task 
revealed that the distant-future condition showed superior 
performance to the other two conditions, which did not dif-
fer. However, the recognition data, collapsed across descrip-
tion and no-description control in the same manner, showed 
that it was the near-future condition that differed from the 
distant-future and control conditions, which did not differ 
from each other (correct identification rates: near-future focus, 
50%; distant-future focus, 72.1%; control, 71.3%). Thus, it is 
not clear that the recognition task and insight problem-
solving tasks are both influenced by temporal distance in 
the same manner. The use of insight problem solving as a 
measure of high-level construal is also problematic because 
the engagement with these tasks might have carryover effects 
on the final recognition task that followed. 
The difficulty in interpreting Hunt and Carroll’s (2008) 
findings stem in part from the complexity of the design, in 
which participants first described (or not) a face and then 
were subject to the manipulation of temporal focus. Addi-
tionally, participants completed a number of other tasks of 
unknown construal level (arithmetic tasks, spot-the-difference 
tasks, a puzzle task, and insight problem-solving tasks were 
all used at different phases of the study). The authors’ inter-
pretation of the interaction observed between verbal descrip-
tion and temporal focus rests on the assumption that the 
effects are additive and that engagement in the other tasks 
had no effect. However, given the absence of a construal 
effect in the no-description control condition, these assump-
tions are open to challenge. Another problem with the study, 
from a theoretical perspective, is that participants were also 
allowed to opt out of selecting a face from the lineup. 
Although this provides ecological validity (as real witnesses 
may reject a lineup entirely), it complicates any interpreta-
tion of the recognition data because the construal manipulation 
could have influenced response bias rather than accuracy. 
Thus, in the present research, we investigated the effects of 
temporal distance in a simpler design. To maintain the eco-
logical focus of our earlier Navon-based research (Perfect 
et al., 2007) we used a naturalistic encounter between the 
participant and a confederate as the target memory. Our ear-
lier research has shown that this method produces reliable 
Navon effects, replicating those reported by Macrae and 
Lewis (2002). As well as being closer to the realistic condi-
tions under which a witness may encounter a suspect, this 
method has the methodological advantage of preventing par-
ticipants from adopting deliberate encoding strategies at 
study or from rehearsing the face during the retention inter-
val because the final memory test for the confederate is not 
introduced until after the construal manipulation has been 
induced. Consequently, any effects of construal level cannot 
be attributed to such encoding or rehearsal strategies.
Our use of a real-life encounter as the target event repre-
sents a first attempt to study the effects of temporal distance 
(and resulting construal level) in a natural setting. Although 
manipulations of psychological distance have proven to be 
powerful in laboratory experiments, to our knowledge they 
have not be applied in the field, and thus the extent to which 
they are robust in more complex environments remains to be 
seen. Indeed, although incidental social encounters are rela-
tively common in research on eyewitness memory, research 
on person memory has tended to focus on laboratory-based 
paradigms that offer greater experimental control. In recog-
nition of this, a further aim of our research is to explore the 
effects of psychological distance on person memory in the 
context of a relatively complex face-to-face encounter.
Overview of Experiments
In Experiment 1, we address the question of whether psycho-
logical distance influences both face-recognition performance 
and processing style. According to construal-level theory, 
psy chological distance should induce global processing 
whereas psychological proximity should induce detailed 
(feature-based) processing, which should also influence 
face-recognition accuracy. In Experiment 2, we replicate and 
extend the first experiment by exploring other aspects of per-
son memory, such as memory for behavioral and trait infor-
mation, which processing style (and hence construal level) 
might be expected to influence. Traditional investigations of 
person perception (e.g., Hamilton, Katz, & Leirer, 1980; 
Wyer, Bodenhausen, & Srull, 1984) have demonstrated that 
one’s memory for another individual is likely to include both 
abstract information (e.g., personality traits that the person is 
believed to possess) and more concrete information (e.g., 
specific instances in which the person behaved in a particular 
way). To the extent that construal level influences process-
ing of stored person representations, it might be expected to 
shape the nature of information that is retrieved from that 
representation. For example, global processing (resulting 
from high-level construal) might result in retrieval of rela-
tively abstract trait information whereas detailed processing 
(resulting from low-level construal) might result in retrieval 
of relatively concrete behavioral information. Taken together, 
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the present research provides a novel application of construal-
level theory to person and event memory, using a naturalistic 
incidental social interaction. 
Experiment 1
The aims of Experiment 1 are twofold. First, we seek to 
replicate the findings reported by Macrae and Lewis (2002) 
using a manipulation of processing style that does not 
require participants to process spatial information in a way 
that parallels face processing. Macrae and Lewis’s use of 
Navon stimuli to impose global versus detailed processing 
drew participants’ attention to elemental or configural infor-
mation in a manner that is superficially similar to strategies 
known to disrupt or improve face processing. However, if 
processing style (and not attention to certain aspects of spa-
tial information) underlies the effects they report, then 
manipulations that do not involve spatial information should 
produce parallel results. To test this idea, we adopted the 
temporal-focus manipulation used by Hunt and Carroll 
(2008). A second goal of Experiment 1 was to obtain an 
independent indicator of how construal influences process-
ing style in the primary (manipulation) task. The majority of 
previous research on processing style and face recognition 
has relied on inferring differences in processing from differ-
ences in recognition accuracy. The one exception is the 
study by Hunt and Carroll, who measured processing style 
by means of insight problem solving. However, as we argued 
previously, interpreting their results is complicated by a 
number of factors. Consequently, Experiment 1 will provide 
a direct test of the hypothesis that temporal distance influ-
ences processing style by means of a questionnaire asking 
participants to indicate which features of the future event 
they thought about. We expect that thinking about the dis-
tant future will lead to more reports of thinking about the 
meaning of the event (high construal), which will be associ-
ated with better face recognition on the final test. Con-
versely, thinking about the near future will lead to higher 
reports of thinking about the detail of the event (low con-
strual), and poorer face-recognition performance. 
Method
Participants. Ninety volunteers (45 male, 45 female) were 
app roached on campus and agreed to participate in the pres-
ent study. Their ages ranged from 18 to 51 years, with a 
mean of 23.4 (SD = 7.39). No other biographical data were 
collected. 
Procedure. Participants were approached on campus by a 
male confederate who claimed to be lost and looking for a 
particular location. The confederate engaged each partici-
pant in conversation for up to 2 minutes before exiting in 
the direction indicated by the participant. Once the confed-
erate was out of view, the experimenter approached the 
same individual and asked them to participate in a brief psy-
chology study about being at the university. 
Those in the two experimental conditions were asked to 
imagine that they had to give a presentation to prospective 
students visiting the university at an Open Day. It was made 
clear to participants that this was a purely hypothetical sce-
nario. Participants in the distant-future condition (n = 30) 
were told to imagine that the presentation would take place 
after the summer examination period (approximately 5-7 
months later) in an unspecified location on campus. Those in 
the near-future condition (n = 30) were told to imagine that 
the presentation would take place at 3:00 p.m. the next day, 
and they were given the name of a large lecture theater on 
campus. Participants were given 2 minutes to think about 
this scenario before completing a 10-item questionnaire that 
asked them what aspects of the scenario they thought about. 
Half the items in the questionnaire aimed at testing specific 
details of the event (e.g., “I thought about how many slides 
I would use,” “I thought about how long the presentation 
would last”), with the other half designed to test global 
aspects of the event (e.g., “I thought that it would be good for 
my career,” “I thought about how it would benefit the uni-
versity”). Each questionnaire item was presented as a state-
ment, along with a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 
1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). 
Those in the control condition (n = 30) were asked to com-
plete a brief 10-question survey about their attitudes toward 
life as a student. Participants were asked to think about the 
questions for 2 minutes before completing the questionnaire. 
Each question consisted of a brief statement about student 
life (e.g., “I have enjoyed my time at University,” “I’m 
glad I chose the course I did”), along with a 5-point Likert-
type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly 
agree). This questionnaire was used solely as a filler task to 
occupy the participants for the same duration as those in the 
experimental conditions, and it was not analyzed further. 
Upon completion of the questionnaire, participants in all 
conditions were informed that the earlier interaction with 
the confederate had been part of the study and that, if they 
agreed, they would be asked to attempt to identify the con-
federate from a lineup. All participants agreed to participate. 
They were then shown an eight-person simultaneous target-
present photographic lineup and asked to identify the con-
federate they had interacted with previously. There was no 
“not in lineup” option. The photographs were color, each 
sized 55 × 70 mm, depicting males with dark hair, aged 
18-30 years, in a full-frontal head and shoulders pose. No 
attempt was made to hide clothing, but the target was dep icted 
wearing different clothes from those seen during the 
encounter. The photographs were presented in a 2 × 4 
matrix on a single A4 sheet, labeled A to D (top row) and E 
to H (bottom row), with the target in position F. Partici-
pants were allowed to take as long as they wished to make 
their verbal response.
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Results and Discussion
Processing style. The first question of interest is whether 
the effects of temporal distance were detectable in the 
processing-style questionnaire. Likert-type responses to each 
of the five detailed items were summed to provide an overall 
score for detailed processing, and responses to the global 
items were summed to provide an overall global processing 
score. These two measures correlated negatively, r = –.27, 
p < .05. The effects of temporal distance on the two measures 
of processing style were explored in a 2 (temporal distance: 
near future vs. distant future) × 2 (processing style: global 
vs. detailed) mixed-model ANOVA, with repeated measures 
on the second factor. Overall, there was no main effect of 
temporal distance on processing style scores, F < 1, and no 
difference in mean scores on the two subscales, F < 1. How-
ever, the interaction between temporal distance and process-
ing style was significant, F(1, 58) = 10.43, MSE = 12.89, p < 
.01, ηp
2 = .15, and is illustrated in Figure 1.This two-way 
interaction was explored through tests of simple main effects. 
Participants in the distant-future condition reported reliably 
greater agreement with the global questions than the detailed 
questions, F(1, 58) = 7.27, MSE = 14.68, p < .01, d = 0.76, 
whereas the reverse was the case for participants in the near-
future condition, albeit the effect just failed to reach conven-
tional levels of significance on a two-tailed test, F(1, 58) = 
3.50, p < .07, MSE = 11.10, d = 0.52.
Face recognition. The main focus of the study was the 
im pact of temporal distance on subsequent face recognition. 
A binary logistic regression of lineup accuracy demonstrated 
reliable differences across condition, W(2) = 9.07, p = .01, 
Nagelkerke R2 = .20, with 8 of 30 (26.7%) participants in the 
near-future condition correctly identifying the confederate, 
compared to 14 of 30 (46.7%) control participants and 20 of 
30 (66.7%) participants in the distant-future condition. 
Relationship between variables. The final analysis concerned 
the relation between the measures of processing style, as 
measured by the self-report questionnaire, and performance 
on the lineup. Neither subscale of the questionnaire corre-
lated significantly with the outcome of the lineup, although 
both correlations were in the expected directions: The global 
processing scale correlated positively with lineup accuracy, 
r = .25, p < .055, and the detailed processing scale correlated 
nonsignificantly but negatively, r = –.20, p < .12. Collapsing 
the two subscales into a single dimension, with global pro-
cessing scored positively and detailed processing scored 
negatively, revealed a reliable correlation with identification 
accuracy, r = .29, p < .05. 
Summary
This study shows that orienting people toward a future event 
has two effects that vary as a function of temporal proximity: 
Perhaps the least surprising is that people think about the 
upcoming event differently depending on how close in time 
it will occur. Thinking about closer events causes people to 
report thinking more about the features of the event, whereas 
thinking about an event further away in time causes people 
to think about general aspects of the event. More surprising 
is that the same two forms of construal also affect an objec-
tive measure of memory: recognition of a photograph of a 
recently encountered confederate. Those who thought about 
a closely upcoming event were worse at identifying the con-
federate than those who thought about an event further in 
the future, with control performance falling between the two 
conditions. Thus, the pattern observed using the temporal 
distance manipulation replicates that seen by Macrae and 
Lewis (2002), but following a task with no spatial compo-
nent. In so doing, they demonstrate an effect that Hunt and 
Carroll (2008) failed to find: an effect of temporal distance 
on memory performance in a group of participants who had 
not engaged in a prior verbal description of the target. Nota-
bly, our participants were not asked to study the face. Instead 
they had a naturalistic encounter in the field before they were 
made aware of the psychological study. 
Two alternative possibilities present themselves. First, it 
is possible that participants in the distant-future condition 
were induced into a positive mood state through consideration 
of how they might advance their career or help their univer-
sity. Conversely, those in the near-future condition might have 
been anxious because they focused on the details of giving a 
talk.1 Thus, it might be possible that the recognition effects 
are mediated by mood, either directly because mood alters 
global–local focus (e.g., Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005) or 
indirectly because mood mitigates participants’ motivation. 
We return the role of mood on performance following the 
presentation of Experiment 2. A second possibility is that 
5
10
15
Global Detailed
Distant Future Near Future
Figure 1. Agreement with self-reported thoughts on global 
versus detailed aspects of an upcoming speech (means with 
standard errors), as a function of temporal distance
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planning for an event in the near future is more resource 
demanding than planning for the same event in the distant 
future. Depleted attentional resources might, then, account 
for the relatively poor performance displayed by participants 
in the near-future condition. We address this issue in Experi-
ment 2, in which our hypotheses specify that under some cir-
cum stances memory performance will be improved (rather 
than impaired) under conditions of low-level construal. 
Experiment 2
Social encounters provide a plethora of information beyond 
the physical appearance of those we meet. There is ample 
evidence to suggest that we tend to draw immediate inferences 
from others’ behavior, often resulting in well-elaborated 
impressions of their personality (Ambady, Hallahan, & 
Rosenthal, 1995; Ambady & Rosenthal, 1992; Winter & 
Uleman, 1984). The ways in which people perceive, inter-
pret, and later recall information about others’ behavior have 
received a great deal of empirical attention. In general, evi-
dence suggests that people are best able to retrieve informa-
tion they have elaborated. A key finding from this literature 
is that recall of behavioral information is better when it is 
learned with the goal of forming an impression of a target 
person than when it is learned with the goal of memorizing it 
(Hamilton et al., 1980; Wyer et al., 1984). Thus, it seems that 
a more global processing style benefits not only memory for 
a person’s face but also memory for his or her behavior.
However, an alternative hypothesis deserves attention. 
Both face-recognition and impression-formation research 
seem to suggest a general advantage for global (vs. detailed) 
processing. That is, for both faces and behaviors, one might 
expect global processing to result in superior performance. 
However, few studies have investigated the possibility that 
different types of information might be preferentially recalled 
under global versus detailed processing conditions. One 
exception to this rule is suggestive: Research involving indi-
viduals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) reveals that a 
local (i.e., detailed) processing preference may be responsi-
ble for their attention to features rather than configural infor-
mation when processing faces (see Behrmann, Thomas, & 
Humphreys, 2006, for a review). Thus, there is some evi-
dence that detailed processing may actually have an advan-
tage (relative to global processing) when it comes to processing 
certain types of information. In the case of person memory, 
one might expect that whereas global processing might ben-
efit recall of abstract information (e.g., a target person’s dis-
position, goals), detailed processing might yield better recall 
of concrete information (e.g., specific statements made by a 
target person).
Experiment 2 sought to accomplish two aims. First, we 
wanted to replicate the results of Experiment 1 using a dif-
ferent set of procedures and a different confederate. Thus, 
Experiment 2 was carried out in the laboratory and involved 
an interaction between an experimenter and a female confed-
erate. Second, we aimed to test the two alternative hypothe-
ses discussed previously by determining whether greater 
psychological distance (and resulting global processing) 
enhances retrieval of all kinds of information or whether 
recall of certain types of information might be better under 
conditions of low psychological distance (and resulting 
detailed processing). Experiment 2 used a categorization 
task to obtain an indicator of processing style. Previous 
research using this task to measure construal level (Liber-
man, Sagristano, & Trope, 2002) demonstrated that thinking 
about the near future leads participants to classify items 
using a greater number of groups (consistent with a lower 
level of construal), whereas thinking about the distant future 
leads them to identify fewer groups (consistent with a higher 
level of construal). 
Method
Participants. 72 students (51 female) at the University of 
Plymouth participated in the experiment in partial fulfill-
ment of a course requirement. Participants were tested in 
groups of 2 to 5. Data from 16 participants were discarded 
because, when asked to identify the confederate from the 
lineup, they reported that they had previously failed to look 
at her. These participants were evenly distributed across the 
near-future (N = 8) and distant-future (N = 8) conditions of 
the experiment. 
Procedure. Upon arriving at the laboratory, participants 
were greeted by a female experimenter and seated at indi-
vidual desks, set up such that they each had a clear view of 
the entrance. When all participants in a session had arrived, 
the experimenter closed the laboratory door and asked par-
ticipants to fill out a brief demographic information form. 
While participants were completing the form, a female con-
federate abruptly entered the room and announced loudly 
that she was late for the experiment. After consulting her 
schedule, the experimenter informed the confederate that she 
was actually signed up for the following session and so she 
should come back later. The confederate agreed and left the 
room. This interaction took place over 1-2 minutes.
Participants were then asked to begin a study on “imag-
ining the future.” In this study, they were provided with 
three scenarios (going camping, moving to a new apart-
ment, going to a car boot sale). Participants in the near-future 
condition were asked to imagine these scenarios taking 
place within the next week. Participants in the distant-
future condition were asked to imagine these scenarios tak-
ing place the following year. For each scenario, participants 
were provided with a list of 38 items (adapted from Liber-
man et al., 2002) and were asked to group the items so that 
items that “belong together” were in the same group. Par-
ticipants were allowed up to 3 minutes to form as few or as 
many groups as they liked. 
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After completing the grouping task, participants were 
introduced to a new study investigating their memory for an 
event that occurred earlier in the session—namely, the inter-
action between the confederate and the experimenter. Par-
ticipants were first presented with a photo lineup and were 
asked to indicate which of the eight photographs matched the 
person who had entered the room earlier. As in Experiment 1, 
a lineup for participants’ identifications was developed. The 
lineup consisted of eight photographs presented simultane-
ously in a 2 × 4 array. Each photograph was approximately 
50 × 50 mm and showed a frontal view of the head and 
shoulders of a young woman with light hair, aged 18-30 
years. The clothing shown in the lineup photographs differed 
from that worn by the confederate during the study. The 
faces were numbered 1-4 (top row) and 5-8 (bottom row). 
The target’s position varied randomly across participants. 
Participants were required to register a response; that is, 
there was no “not in lineup” option. Participants were then 
asked to provide a written description of the event, from the 
time the confederate entered the room to the time she left.2 
Finally, participants were asked whether they knew the con-
federate or had seen her before. None did.
Results and Discussion
Grouping task. In the present experiment, the total number 
of groups generated by participants in the near-future and 
distant-future conditions was analyzed using an independent 
samples t test. As in previous research, participants in the 
near-future condition generated significantly more groups 
(M = 15.00, s = 2.70) than did those in the distant-future 
condition (M = 12.25, s = 3.26), t(53) = 3.40, p = .001, d = 
0.93. This difference was also significant for each of the 
three individual grouping tasks (ps ≤ .05).
Face Recognition
Participants using a high level of construal (i.e., those in the 
distant-future condition) were expected to engage in more 
global processing, which should benefit their ability to rec-
ognize faces. To test this, a chi-square test was used to assess 
the effect of construal level on face-recognition accuracy. 
Consistent with predictions, participants in the distant-future 
condition were more likely to correctly identify the confed-
erate (50%) than were those in the near-future condition 
(14.29%), χ2(1) = 8.19, p = .009.
Narrative descriptions. Participants’ descriptions of the event 
were coded on two dimensions. First, two independent coders 
(blind to condition) rated each description on the extent to 
which it included details of the event (e.g., the specific state-
ments made by the confederate or experimenter). Ratings 
were made on a 1-10 scale with higher numbers reflecting a 
greater level of detail. Second, the same coders rated each 
description on the extent to which it referred to the meaning of 
the event (such as the confederate’s goals: e.g., “She wanted to 
do the experiment”; or personality: e.g., “She was a bit rude”). 
Ratings were made on a 1-10 scale with higher numbers 
reflecting a greater level of meaning. Interrater reliability was 
satisfactory for both detail and meaning dimensions (αs= .89 
and .92, respectively), so ratings were averaged for analysis. 
Ratings of detail and meaning were first entered as repeated 
measures in an ANOVA with construal condition entered as 
a between-subjects factor (see Figure 2). The analysis indi-
cated a significant main effect of rating type, F(1, 54) = 
42.09, MSE = 2.88, p < .001, ηp
2 = .44, such that participants’ 
recall of the event included more detail (M = 5.27, s = 1.43) 
than meaning (M = 3.19, s = 2.11) information. Consistent 
with predictions, however, this was qualified by a significant 
interaction between construal and type of description, F(1, 
54) = 13.72, MSE = 2.88, p = .001, ηp
2 = .20. To decompose 
the interaction, simple main effects were computed for each 
type of description. These revealed that participants in the 
near-future condition used more details in their descriptions 
(M = 5.77, s = 1.16) than did those in the distant-future con-
dition (M = 4.77, s = 1.52), F(1, 54) = 7.68, MSE = 1.82, p = 
.008, d = 0.74. In contrast, participants in the distant-future 
condition described a greater level of meaning (M = 3.88, s = 
2.29) than did those in the near-future condition (M = 2.50, 
s = 1.70), F(1, 54) = 6.52, MSE = 4.06, p = .014, d = 0.68.3 
Relationships among variables. Correlational analyses were 
also carried out to determine the extent to which recollection 
of the event was related to the number of groups generated 
during the planning task (which may serve as an indicator of 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Meaning Detail
Distant Future Near Future
Figure 2. Number of meaning-related versus detail-related items 
recalled from experimenter-confederate interaction (means with 
standard errors), as a function of temporal distance
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global vs. local processing). Ratings of meaning were sig-
nificantly negatively correlated with the number of groups 
generated, r = –.48, p < .001, whereas ratings of detail were 
marginally positively correlated with the number of groups 
generated, r = .24, p = .07. Finally, recognition accuracy was 
marginally negatively correlated with the number of groups 
generated during the planning task, r = –.24, p = .08. 
Summary
Experiment 2 replicated and extended the results obtained in 
Experiment 1. As in the first study, our manipulation of tem-
poral distance had a number of effects on participants’ infor-
mation processing. First, replicating past research by Liberman 
et al. (2002), participants who considered events in the near 
future drew finer distinctions among groups of objects to be 
used in those events than did those who considered the same 
events in the distant future. More importantly, replicating 
Experiment 1, participants who were led to think about the 
distant future displayed greater accuracy in identifying the 
confederate encountered earlier, compared to participants 
led to think about the near future. Finally, although temporal 
distance had no overall effect on the amount of information 
recalled from the interaction between the confederate and 
experimenter, it did significantly affect the type of informa-
tion recalled. Participants in the distant-future condition were 
more likely to report information related to the meaning of 
the interaction (e.g., the confederate’s goals) whereas those 
in the near-future condition were more likely to report spe-
cific details from the interaction (e.g., specific statements 
made by either the confederate or the experimenter).
Thus, Experiment 2 demonstrates that temporal distance 
influences multiple aspects of perceivers’ description of an 
event during a free recall task. Retrieval of a target’s behav-
iors and dispositions as well as his or her appearance is 
improved or impaired, depending on a manipulation of psy-
chological distance that took place in an unrelated task, as 
part of an ostensibly separate experiment. These findings 
support the hypothesis that construal level has broad impli-
cations for how people recall events. As in the first experi-
ment, Experiment 2 showed that alternate indices of pro cessing 
style derived from the task in which psychological distance 
was manipulated (in this case, the extent to which partici-
pants formed well-differentiated categories) correlate with 
memory measures in an independent task in a theoretically 
meaningful way. Category differentiation was positively cor-
related with recall of event details but negatively correlated 
with reporting of event meaning.
General Discussion
The two experiments reported here provide preliminary evi-
dence in support of the hypothesis that psychological dis-
tance influences memory for people and events. Collectively, 
these two studies suggest that temporal distance can influ-
ence both recognition memory and recall of a complex event. 
For face recognition, the same pattern was evident in both 
studies despite the use of a different confederate, different 
induction of future focus, and a different lineup. Thus, the 
effect appears to have some generality. 
These findings add to the growing literature showing 
that performance on face identification tests, particularly 
those involving lineups, can be impaired, or improved, by 
prior en gagement in different kinds of cognitive task. We 
have already described the work supporting the transfer-
inappropriate processing account of verbal overshadowing 
(Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990; Westerman & Larsen, 
1997) and that demonstrating the effects of prior local or 
global processing of Navon letters (Macrae & Lewis, 2002; 
Perfect et al., 2007). Lewis (2006) showed a similar effect: 
Participants who engaged in a cryptic crossword subse-
quently performed more poorly on a lineup task than those 
who had attempted literal crosswords or sudoku puzzles, or 
those who had simply read an extract from a novel. More 
recently Perfect, Weston, Dennis, and Snell (2008) showed a 
reversed effect using Navon stimuli with reversed precedence 
to the standard stimuli. By reducing the spatial frequency of 
the elements (i.e., making the constituent letters farther apart), 
perceivers’ default response shifted to attend to the elements 
themselves rather than to the global shape they constituted. In 
that research, participants who were forced to report the global 
shape subsequently performed more poorly on a lineup, and 
those who reported the local elements of the shapes subse-
quently showed improved performance, relative to control. 
The present work is consistent with this line of research, 
in that it shows that identification performance can be 
enhanced, or impaired, by inducing processing style through 
temporal distance. Moreover, it builds on the literature in a 
number of key ways. Most importantly, the studies here 
show that the effects of processing bias do not simply reduce 
to a matter of better or worse performance. Processing bias 
makes memory performance different. It is true that face-
recognition performance in a lineup is worse after inducing 
low-level construal, but aspects of the detail of the event are 
better recalled. Thus, construal level alters what is retrieved, 
not how much retrieval takes place. Finally, the studies add 
to the range of tasks that are shown to produce processing 
shifts that influence subsequent performance on event mem-
ory tasks, and so help constrain theorizing about what the 
nature of any processing shift might involve. 
Construal and Modes of Processing
The research reported here highlights several intriguing fea-
tures of construal effects and of transfer-inappropriate pro-
cessing in general. Previous work on construal effects has 
often focused on outcomes that relate directly to the manipu-
lation of psychological distance (cf. Förster, Friedman, & 
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Liberman, 2004; Wakslak & Trope, 2009). For example, 
considering an event that will take place in the near or distant 
future affects the way one processes information related to 
that event (e.g., Liberman et al., 2002). In the current research, 
temporal distance not only influenced processing of the 
event being construed but carried over to affect subsequent 
processing of information (i.e., recognition and recall) in a 
context that was irrelevant to the task in which high-level 
versus low-level construal was invoked. Furthermore, our 
manipulations of temporal distance affected face recognition 
in ways parallel to more direct manipulations of global ver-
sus local processing (e.g., Macrae & Lewis, 2002; Perfect 
et al., 2007; Perfect et al., 2008) and affected other aspects of 
event memory in ways parallel to previous research on pro-
cessing goals and person memory (e.g., Adaval & Wyer, 
2004; Hamilton et al., 1980). 
Thus, our results, in conjunction with previous work on 
modes of processing and memory, suggest some possible 
connections between different conceptions of processing 
style (global vs. local, holistic vs. feature based, high level 
vs. low level, gestalt vs. detailed, heuristic vs. analytic) that 
have been discussed in the diverse literatures on face process-
ing and person memory. Although the present experiments 
were not designed to conclusively determine how these dis-
tinctions relate to one another, they do provide potential dir-
ections for further investigation. One possibility worth 
exp loring may be that manipulations of temporal distance 
instigate an attentional bias toward global versus detailed 
information, which may manifest itself in different ways 
depending on the information-processing task. When an 
attentional bias toward global information is induced, cogni-
tive processing about the task at hand (e.g., planning for an 
event in the distant future) may be oriented toward the 
abstract meaning of the event (e.g., what goals will be met). 
Carrying over to a subsequent processing task (e.g., face rec-
ognition or recall of an event), this attentional bias may 
directly affect how new stimuli are processed (e.g., config-
ural information will be used in processing faces), as well as 
selective memory for meaning-related information. In con-
trast, when an attentional bias toward detailed information is 
induced, processing about the task at hand (e.g., planning for 
an event in the near future) may be oriented toward the 
details of the event (e.g., the specifics of how the event will 
unfold). In subsequent tasks, the attentional bias may influ-
ence processing of new stimuli (e.g., features will be attended 
to when processing faces), as well as selective memory for 
detail-related information. 
It is perhaps worth noting that we do not, in these experi-
ments, treat processing style in the primary task (where con-
strual level is invoked) as a “content-free” measure of 
processing style more generally. Thus, we did not use the 
questionnaire measure (in Experiment 1) or the category-
formation measure (in Experiment 2) as mediators in our anal-
yses. Although we believe these tasks are strongly influenced 
by processing style, there are other factors (e.g., expertise 
with the domains being considered) that are likely to affect 
participants’ responses. In agreement with Wakslak and 
Trope (2009), we “do not believe that [processing style] in 
any particular domain should be uniquely responsible for the 
effects of construal” (p. 57). Thus, although we would expect 
(as we found) that participants who show a stronger response to 
construal level in one domain (e.g., planning for a presenta-
tion) to would also show a stronger response in subsequent 
tasks (e.g., recognizing faces), we believe that formal tests of 
mediation would require process-pure (i.e., content-free and 
domain-general) measures of processing style.
Alternative Accounts
The preceding discussion was framed firmly within an 
information-processing framework, with the current find-
ings explained as a consequence of shifting information-
processing style. However, an alternative account derives 
from the “broaden-and-build” theory of emotions (Fredrickson, 
1998, 2001) and the work relating mood, construal level, and 
face recognition (Johnson & Fredrickson, 2005). Specifi-
cally, the broaden-and-build theory predicts that positive mood 
states lead people to adopt a broader scope of attention. For 
instance, Fredrickson and Branigan (2005) demonstrated 
that participants in a happy mood were more likely to show 
global response bias toward ambiguous Navon-like stimuli 
than those in an anxious or neutral mood. More pertinently, 
Johnson and Fredrickson (2005) explored the effect of 
manipulating mood state on face-recognition ability. Those 
in the neutral or anxious-mood conditions showed the well-
established pattern of superior recognition performance for 
own-race faces relative to other-race faces. However, those in 
a happy mood showed equally accurate recognition of other-
race as own-race faces. Thus, there is evidence that positive 
mood may enhance face recognition, at least for some faces. 
However, although we acknowledged the possibility that 
mood may have played a mediating role in Experiment 1, there 
are a number of arguments against this interpretation. Fore-
most is the argument based on parsimony: The information-
processing account explains the data without the need to 
impute an unmeasured mood state. The effects of temporal 
distance resemble those following interventions based on the 
Navon task (Macrae & Lewis, 2002), where no mood induc-
tion is implied. Furthermore, Experiment 2 showed the same 
pattern of face-recognition performance despite using an alter-
nate induction of temporal distance. Given that there is no a 
priori reason to believe that the two temporal distance tasks 
would result in the same pattern of positive and negative 
mood across the manipulations of near and far temporal dis-
tance, we believe it is more parsimonious to attribute the effects 
directly to construal, without involving mood in the equation. 
Moreover, the evidence that mood influences face recog-
nition is only partially supportive of a mood-based account. 
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Johnson and Fredrickson (2005) found that direct manipula-
tions of mood failed to moderate face recognition for own-
race faces and that negative mood failed to influence reco gnition 
of other-race faces. For the results of the present studies to be 
mediated by mood, one would have to argue that our manip-
ulations, involving consideration of future states, resulted in 
greater mood shifts (and so had a greater impact on face rec-
ognition) than having participants watch video clips of stand-
up comedians or horror movies (Johnson & Fredrickson, 
2005). Given that participants in our studies knew that the 
future orientation tasks were entirely hypothetical, this does 
not seem plausible. 
Finally, it is worth noting that a considerable number of 
studies have provided more direct evidence against the 
hypothesis that construal level influences subsequent pro-
cessing because it affects mood. For instance, Wakslak and 
Trope (2009) recently reported a series of studies in which 
construal level (manipulated in various ways) was shown to 
influence probability judgments. In several of their studies, 
they also obtained measures of participants’ mood following 
the construal manipulation. In none of these did they find 
evidence that the effect of construal level on judgments was 
mediated by mood. Similarly, Förster et al. (2004) reported a 
series of studies in which the effect of temporal distance on 
creativity was examined. In establishing that high-level con-
strual produced greater creativity, they ruled out the possibil-
ity that the effect was mediated by positive mood. Thus, 
although we did not obtain direct measures of mood in the 
current studies, there appears to be reasonable evidence to 
argue against the possibility that mood played a major role in 
producing our results.
In addition to the alternative account in terms of mood 
(detailed previously), a second alternative explanation for 
the effects of construal on face recognition is that our con-
strual manipulations either enhanced or decreased the atten-
tional resources available to participants. It is plausible to 
consider that planning for an imminent event might deplete 
cognitive resources, which might then impair performance on 
subsequent cognitive tasks (e.g., recognizing faces). How-
ever, our finding that cognitive performance is improved on 
tasks where detailed processing is advantageous (e.g., recall-
ing the details of an event) suggests that it is construal level, 
and not cognitive resources per se, that is responsible for the 
range of effects reported here.
Which Memories Are Affected, and When
Finally, the experiments reported here also open new avenues 
of research into person memory and event memory in gen-
eral. Research in the person memory tradition has typically 
employed experimental contexts that are relatively impover-
ished, primarily involving the presentation of isolated verbal 
or pictorial stimuli (cf. Adaval & Wyer, 2004). In contrast, 
everyday social encounters involve far more information 
than behaviors and faces, and are typically context rich. The 
current research offers an initial investigation into how peo-
ple process information about these more complex social 
events. It also raises new questions about how and when pro-
cessing style may be influential. Everyday events are rich in 
both social and nonsocial information, much of which can be 
processed either globally or in a more detailed fashion. For 
example, the physical environment contains both detailed 
information (the objects present in a scene) and global or 
configural information (e.g., where objects are located in 
relation to each other, what the overall scene looks like). 
Shifts in processing style that accompany high- versus low-
level construal may be expected to affect how physical scenes 
are recalled.
Other questions also require further research to find 
answers. The experiments reported here imposed a high- or 
low-level construal after the target event had occurred. Thus, 
construal level appears to have influenced the retrieval of 
information that had already been encoded and stored in 
memory. Indeed, much research on face recognition fol-
lows these procedures (Macrae & Lewis, 2002; Schooler & 
Engstler-Schooler, 1990). As such, our results add to existing 
evidence that different aspects of the very same memory can 
be retrieved depending on one’s current mode of processing. 
It remains to be determined what, if any, influence con-
strual level has on the encoding of information. That is, adop-
ting a global versus detailed processing style may be exp ected 
to influence attention to and interpretation of information in 
an event, such that memory storage and not only retrieval is 
likely to be affected by construal level. For example, when 
witnessing the same event, individuals operating at a high-
level construal may only attend to (and therefore encode) the 
meaning of the event, whereas those operating at a low-level 
construal may be more likely to attend to the details. Simi-
larly, high-level construal is likely to promote attribution and 
inference processes that would facilitate storage of meaning-
related information, perhaps at the expense of specific details.
An Ecological Caveat
Strictly speaking, the lineups used in these experiments fail 
two methodological criteria for appropriate tests of eyewit-
ness memory. The standard approach in eyewitness research 
is to enable witnesses to reject the entire lineup, as would be 
the case in the real world where witness may not identify 
anyone. This is achieved through provision of “unbiased” 
instructions to the witness that the true perpetrator may or 
may not be present (Malpass & Devine, 1981). Such an 
approach leaves open the possibility that a change in identi-
fication could be due to a change in willingness to select 
anyone, and therefore a methodological approach used in 
eyewitness research is to include target-absent lineups to 
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control for such a response bias. We adopted neither of these 
procedures, and so it is hard to generalize our findings to 
real-world conditions. However, the cost of low ecological 
validity is more than outweighed by the theoretical clarity 
that our data provide. The lack of unbiased instructions means 
that there can be no response-bias account of our data, as all 
participants were required to give an identification response. 
Our design is effectively a single-trial forced-choice test of 
memory with a fixed response criterion. Consequently, the 
observed differences in performance across conditions reflect 
changes in memory accuracy, not response bias. 
Conclusions and Applications
The research reported here makes a number of novel and 
important contributions to our understanding of how per-
ceivers recognize others and recall details about their behav-
ior. Few prior studies have investigated memory for both the 
physical appearance and the behavior of a target person 
(cf. Adaval & Wyer, 2004). In this research, we have estab-
lished that processing style, as determined by construal level, 
affects multiple aspects of perceivers’ recall of an event and 
the other people involved in it. Construal-level theory pro-
vides a useful framework for investigating the influence of 
processing style on various dimensions of person memory 
and raises important questions for further research on the 
factors that influence which information perceivers are able 
to access from their representation of an event. 
Clearly, the results of the present studies raise many ques-
tions about how construal might be applied to other situations 
in which memories of a person or event must be retrieved. 
While these data are provocative, it will be important for 
future research to determine the generality and robustness of 
these effects before we can assess whether they might be 
used to help witnesses recall past events or recognize previ-
ously seen individuals. Many other research questions natu-
rally arise. To what extent can processing style be switched 
from global to detailed (and back again) to access different 
aspects of memory? Once high-level or low-level construal 
is induced, how long-lasting are its effects? How might con-
strual level interact with other factors, such as the group 
membership of the target being recalled—for example, do 
temporal distance effects only apply to own-race face recog-
nition? Does temporal distance affect recognition of indi-
vidual face parts, as well as whole faces from a lineup? We 
hope that the present research provides a springboard for 
others to explore these and many other questions. 
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Notes
1. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
2. It is important to note here that participants were instructed to 
write what they remembered about the event—in doing so, we 
assume that they reported those aspects of the event that they 
were able to retrieve. Because we used a free-recall task rather 
than a recognition task, we cannot unequivocally rule out the 
possibility that participants were able to remember more than 
they reported. However, given the experimental instructions that 
placed a demand on participants to report what they could, we 
believe we are safe in concluding that participants reported those 
aspects of their memories that were spontaneously retrieved in 
response to the prompt to recall the event.
3. The narrative descriptions were also examined for differences 
in accuracy and valence. Comparisons on these dimensions 
are necessarily confounded by differences in the nature of the 
information recalled. Because near-future participants recalled 
more specific details of the event, they necessarily recalled 
more objectively accurate information (in contrast to distant-
future participants who reported more inferences that cannot be 
classified as objectively correct or incorrect). However, inspec-
tion of the objectively verifiable information recalled by par-
ticipants in each condition indicates that recall accuracy was at 
ceiling for both near-future (M = 98%, s = 0.05) and distant-future 
participants (M = 99%, s = 0.03) and did not differ between 
conditions, t(54) = 0.95, p = .35, d = 0.26. Similarly, because 
the nature of the staged interaction was mildly negative (the 
confederate entered and left the room abruptly and had a loud 
interaction with the experimenter), descriptions of the meaning 
of the event would necessarily be more negative than reports of 
the specific details. Hence, because distant-future participants 
reported more meaning-related information, they also included 
more negative information in their descriptions. However, 
inspecting the valence (coded on a 1-10 scale from very nega-
tive to very positive) of meaning-related information reported, 
there was no difference between near-future (M = 4.42, s = 
0.51) and distant-future (M = 4.26, s = 0.62) participants, t(35) = 
0.85, p = .40, d = 0.29.
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